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Contemporary understanding of riots: classical crowd psychology, ideology 
and the social identity approach. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper explores the origins and ideology of classical crowd psychology, a 
body of theory reflected in contemporary popularised understandings such as of 
the 2011 English Ǯriotsǯ. The paper argues that during the 19th Century the crowd came to symbolise a fear of Ǯmass societyǯ and that Ǯclassicalǯ crowd 
psychology was a product of these fears. Classical crowd psychology 
pathologised, reified and de-contextualised the crowd, offering the ruling elites a 
perceived opportunity to control it. We contend that classical theory 
misrepresents crowd psychology and survives in contemporary understanding 
because it is ideological. We conclude by discussing how classical theory has 
been supplanted in academic contexts by an identity-based crowd psychology 
that restores the meaning to crowd action, replaces it in its social context, and in 
so doing is transforming theoretical understanding of Ǯriots' and the nature of the 
self.  
  
 1 
Popular Understandings of the 2011 English riots.  
In August 2011 rioting broke out in Tottenham, London following a protest 
about the fatal police shooting of a young man called Mark Duggan. Across the next four days this Ǯriotingǯ spread throughout London and to other cities across 
England (Guardian/LSE, 2011). Media and political commentators were quick to 
provide explanations of the nature and underlying causes of the riots as 
unconnected to the shooting of Mr Duggan or other potentially Ǯlegitimateǯ 
grievances and grounded instead in the psychology of the crowd or the 
individual making up the crowds involved (Reicher & Stott, 2011). In a television interview, Tottenhamǯs MP David Lammy confidently asserted that the rioters 
were ǲmindless peopleǳ (ibid. p.6). Metropolitan Police Commander Adrian 
Hanstock described how an otherwise peaceful protest had been "hijacked by 
mindless thugs" (ibid. p.6). As the riots spread, newspaper headlines of 'mayhem', 'anarchyǯ and 'mob rule' conveyed an image of them as indiscriminate and 
irrational. Academic commentators confirmed such views of the riotsǯ aetiology 
in irrationality and moral breakdown. One national newspaper interviewed Jack 
Levin, a Professor of Sociology and Criminology, who argued that crowds are a place where people ǲabandon their sense of personal identityǳ and that riots are caused by a ǲrapid decent into mob mentalityǳ (ibid. p.14). John Brewer and 
Harold Wollman, then President and Vice Chair of the British Sociological 
Association, wrote about the riots arguing that crowds ǲare irrationalǳ and that ǲreason and motive disappear when crowds move unpredictablyǳ1. 
 
                                                        
1 For full text see http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/11/sociologists-offer-unravel-
riots 
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Such views of the aberrant, irrational and pathological crowd are important 
because they were also directly associated to particular forms of policing and 
policy response. At the policy level, the UK Government responded to the riots with the ǮTroubled Familiesǯ programme, a multi-million pound investment 
designed to address a form of moral breakdown among recalcitrant elements of 
otherwise civilised communities. Policing was also roundly and ubiquitously condemned for, as one national newspaper headline trumpeted, being ǲtoo few, 
too slow, too timidǳ. Given this widespread view of the crowd as Ǯmindlessǯ the 
policy response was not to retreat from police use of force but to empower and 
applaud it. A national newspaper front page showing a picture of a police officer in Ǯriot gearǯ aiming a baton gun, powerfully announced the headline ǲWe’ll Shoot 
the Lootersǳ. The only formal Government consultation that took place 
subsequent to the riots concerned whether or not the police should be given 
powers to impose curfew. Therefore, underpinning these policing and policy 
responses were a set of popularised understandings of crowd psychology. 
However, these are not new – understandings; they have been found whenever 
there is a riot, and their usage has been documented for well over a hundred 
years. 
 
The nineteenth century origins of classical crowd psychology.  
Reicher and Stott (2011) show how these popularised conceptualisations of 
crowd psychology as aberrant and pathological faithfully echo the scientific 
theories of the classical crowd psychology that originated in France at the end of 
the 19th century (Le Bon, 1895; Taine, 1876). French society throughout the 19th 
Century was very turbulent, and many social historians have argued that central 
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to these political changes were the actions of Ǯthe crowdǯ (Lefebvre 1962, 1964; 
Rudé, 1964, 1967). Indeed, even a brief glimpse at the patterning in these crowds 
reveals much about them.  ǲThey embodied resistance to the growth of a national 
market exercising priority over local needs and traditions. This was the pattern: 
the disturbances were clustered in areas torn between the needs of the local 
population and the demands of the national marketǳ (Tilly et al. 1975: 51).  
 
The social hierarchies of aristocratic society were often legitimated through the 
idea of the powerful as the providers of food (Reddy 1977). The rise of the 
industrial capitalist economy during the 19th Century led to practices that 
ultimately came into conflict with this paternalist model of social legitimacy. For 
example, when the demands of the government and national market ensured 
that local needs for food would not be met, it was then that locals began to act 
collectively. But the actions of these crowds were not some irrational explosion 
of random and sporadic violence driven merely by hunger. They acted in terms 
of what E.P. Thompson (1971) refers to as a Ǯmoral economyǯ. They ǲfollowed a 
well defined routine in which the actors assumed the place of the authorities but 
melted away when the authorities took the approved action, even if people 
remained hungry. Each incident tended to display a kind of coherence and 
conscious intent, which fits ill with the word usually applied: riotǳ (Tilly et al. 1975: 
51).  
 
As the 19th Century progressed the scale of industrialisation and the wealth and 
power of the bourgeois elite increased. Accompanying this industrialisation, 
came ever larger increases in urban populations. In many senses 
 4 
industrialisation created an explosion in the scale of urban society; for the first 
time in history large urban populations emerged. No longer tied to the land, 
where employers and workers had previously lived and worked in close 
proximity, in the new cities rich and poor lived far apart. The traditional means 
of social control also evaporated. As industrialisation grew at pace, employers 
and workers who were previously often in daily contact became more and more 
separate physically, socially, economically and politically. Whilst industrial 
wealth fell into the hands of an ever shrinking but increasingly powerful 
capitalist elite, wages for their workers remained low. So despite dying on the 
barricades to create the political conditions for change, workers consistently 
found themselves isolated, poverty stricken and stuck in the lower echelons of 
the emerging class structure. With no franchise, the masses had no means of 
resisting the negative impacts of these transitions. It was therefore the crowd 
that was their only weapon of political resistance.  
 
During this period, a series of developing political philosophies were also 
bringing into question the nature and legitimacy of this emerging social order. Of particular significance was Jean Jacques Rousseauǯs work on the social contract 
(Rousseau, 1762). Rousseau had argued forcefully for greater equality between 
the powerful and the powerless, claiming that the people should be sovereign. 
During the period of mass industrialisation and the emergence of the working 
class, Rousseauǯs ideas began to be increasingly reflected in the political 
ideologies of socialism. Such ideas were also developed by the emerging 
revolutionary political analyses of writers and activists such as Charles Fourier, 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Louis Blanc and Karl Marx (McClelland, 1970). This 
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politics was not only a basis among the urban poor for radicalisation but also for 
collective action in the form of the crowd. Thus as the industrial revolution 
progressed the crowd began to act in ways that posed a direct threat to the social 
arrangements necessary for successful capitalist expansion.  
 
In February 1848, crowds took once again to the streets of Paris and toppled the 
Orléaniste regime. The new regime was short-lived and by June 1848 previously 
allied republican moderates and radicals were soon engaged in armed conflict on 
the streets of Paris. The ǮJune daysǯ of 1848 marked a turning point in French, 
indeed in European, history that is crucial to understanding the 
conceptualisation of the crowd that emerged in the latter half of the 19th 
century. For Karl Marx the June insurrection was a class war, a struggle between 
proletariat and bourgeois. As such future revolution would mean the overthrow 
of bourgeois society. The June revolt of 1848 represents one of the first major 
armed conflicts of class against class, an attempt not to change the form of 
government but to change the social order itself (Horne 1989).  
 
Taking this together then, the early part of the 19th century must be understood 
not only in terms of a period of technological development. It must also be 
understood as a period of social transformation in which large-scale urban 
society was born. Along with this transformation came an alienated and 
disenfranchised urban proletariat increasingly polarised against a powerful 
bourgeois elite. Thus on the one hand there was a developing national state in 
France, expanding and imposing its interests. On the other there were outraged 
localised populations attempting to contest this. In other words, crowds of this 
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time must be understood in terms of inter-group conflicts linked to the struggles 
of an emerging national political economy. As the poor agitated, the bourgeois 
class allied themselves with them to overthrow the aristocracy. However, once in 
power, they turned to the reactionary arms of the conservative wings of the state 
to stabilise the economy, and in so doing acted against the interests of their 
former allies.  
 
Having repressed the radicals in June 1848, moderate republicans again turned 
to a ruler who could best serve the interests of the bourgeoisie. Napoleon Bonaparteǯs nephew Louis promised security against social unrest and was 
elected president. With his term of office limited to four years and in the face of 
parliamentary opposition to any extension, Louis Napoleon and the army carried 
out a coup dǯétat. However, the bourgeoisie rallied to the new Empire in an 
attempt to ensure stability in the face of an increasing fear of mass action, much 
as their forefathers had turned to the Napoleon Bonaparte to put an end to the 
revolution. The greatest testimony to this fear is the architecture of Paris. To 
break the revolutionary potential of the crowd, Emperor Napoleon III 
commissioned Baron Haussmann to re-design the city. His aim was to break 
apart the habitual storm-centres of the radical working class areas in the city 
centre and destroy the narrow and easily barricaded streets. Haussmann pulled 
down twenty thousand houses, rebuilding central Paris with long, straight, open 
boulevards that afforded excellent fields of fire and opportunities not just to turn 
the flank of a barricade but to transport riot breakers quickly from one end of 
Paris to the other. In this sense, modern Paris is a monument to the growing fear 
of the revolutionary potential of the crowd. However, and ironically, the new 
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solidly proletarian suburbs created through Ǯ(ausmannisationǯ would in ͳͺ͹ͳ 
pose an even greater revolutionary threat to the establishing European 
industrial order.  
 
French workers of the Empire were denied the benefits of ever-increasing 
industrial expansion. It is estimated that by 1862 over half the population of 
Paris lived in poverty bordering on destitution (Horne, 1989). The rich got richer 
while the poor got poorer adequately summarises life under Louis Napoleon. The 
new class division between wealthy and worker, proprietor and proletariat, 
entrenched in French society during the Orléaniste monarchy, reinforced 
through the June days of 1848, became more and more acute under the Empire. 
A Republican journalist of the period wrote of the bourgeoisie that ǲtheir 
privileges safe, they allow Napoleon III to plunder France, make her the vassal of 
Rome, dishonour her in Mexico, ruin her finances, vulgarise debauchery. All-
powerful by their retainers and wealth, they do not risk a man, a dollar, for the 
sake of protestingǳ (Lissagray 1876: 9).  
 
1870 marked the rise of a new power in Europe. Prussia needed to cement the 
newly unified German Empire. In July 1870 the Germans manoeuvred politically 
over the ascent to the Spanish throne and on July 15th a politically isolated and 
militarily weak France declared war. The declaration of war initially reinforced 
the urban proletariatǯs resentment of the bourgeoisie, for they felt that war was 
avoidable. The French army was ill-prepared and its weaponry out-dated. By 6th 
August the rapidly mobilised German army equipped with modern Krupp 
artillery had the French on the defensive and on 1st September the French 
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capitulated. La Débâcle left nothing between the Prussian forces and Paris except 
distance (Zola, 1892).  
 
In Paris news of the defeat brought a midnight session of the Corps Legislatif and 
an attack by the Republican opposition on supporters of the Empire. The crowd 
once again came to the fore as a vehicle of political change. The masses invaded 
the Chamber and the vigilant police state collapsed. A new Government of ǮNational Defenceǯ had at their disposal an armed force of some 500,000 men. 
But the vast majority of this force was composed of the Garde National, the 
battalions of which were drawn primarily from Paris on an arrondissement 
basis. So the Hausmannisation of Paris backfired because it ensured that large 
sections of the Garde contained the alienated masses of the Parisian proletariat. 
By arming them, the Government essentially armed the revolutionary socialist 
movement of France. For the Garde this was no longer an Imperial war but an 
opportunity to defend their class interests.  
 
By the 19th September the Prussians took the unprotected high plateau 
surrounding Paris at Chateillon, cutting her off from the rest of France. The siege 
of Paris had begun. During the siege, radical resistance remained strong. The 
radicals wasted no time in pushing to link a continued war effort with social 
reform. For the government the essential priority became defence against the 
forces of the revolutionary masses rather than defence against the Germans. So 
in January 1871, the government negotiated an armistice in order to enable 
national elections and free the country from its dependency on the increasingly 
radical Paris. The radicals saw this capitulation as the next act of treachery by 
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the bourgeoisie. In the elections, while capturing a majority within Paris, the 
radicals suffered a massive defeat nationally and a rural cleric-monarchical 
alliance formed a majority in the new Assembly. On the 26th February Adolphe 
Thiers signed a treaty with Bismark that was ratified by the Assembly. Under its 
terms France signed away the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, agreed to 
indemnity, and crucially had to reduce the statesǯ regular forces to only one 
division.  
 
Paris was not prepared to accept the authority of the Assembly. The proletariat-
dominated Garde refused to disarm. Outside the Prussian army it was now the 
single largest military force in France. By March a Central Committee of the 
Garde proposed that Paris constitute itself as an independent socialist Republic. 
Realising the peril of their position, the Assembly evacuated the city to the Palace 
of Versailles and the Garde’s Central Committee declared the ǮParis Communeǯ; Europeǯs first Socialist Republic was established and armed. Fearing the 
reverberation of the Commune in the wider European context, the victorious 
powers re-armed the forces of the Assembly. Soon after, these forces re-entered 
Paris and enacted La Semaine sanglante, so called because the Seine was said to 
have run red with the blood of the Communards.  Once victorious, the forces of 
the Assembly sought to restore the 'natural' order by ridding the world of 
revolutionary terror. By the end of the Ǯtrialsǯ and executions, at least 20,000 
Parisians, mostly workers, had been killed, seventy five per cent of which are 
said not to have been involved in the fighting (Horne 1989; Lissagray 1876). 
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The disappearing context of classical crowd psychology. 
The brief overview above has sought to demonstrate that the actions of the 
crowds throughout the 19th Century were tied to the emerging politics of 
industrial society. In this sense, the crowd can only be adequately understood in 
terms of agency and meaningful social actions embedded in a series of struggles 
between groups emerging from and tied to a developing social and political 
context. While violence was integral to that struggle, it was often the state and 
not the crowd that was its primary initiator.  
 
But during 1871 a respected French academic Hippolyte Taine was giving a 
series of lectures at Oxford. As a measure of his international prestige, he was 
awarded a Doctorate in Civil Law by the University during his visit. It was during 
his stay that the Paris Commune ran its course. Already dismayed by the war, 
Taine was deeply shaken as he followed the events through English newspapers. 
Taine, born in 1828, was among a tradition of French right-wing thinkers who 
were critical of the Enlightenment and the Revolution of 1789, including Joseph 
De Maistre, Edouard Drumont, and George Sorel (McClelland 1970). As such, 
Taine was profoundly anti-Jacobin and felt that the Commune would see a repeat 
of the June days of 1848, or worse still, its Committees would repeat the Terrors 
of the 1790s. In this time of crisis he saw it as his duty to devote himself to his 
nation and was inspired to write a voluminous social history to help repair the 
maladies of contemporary France. The book eventually ran to eleven volumes 
and was called the Origins of Contemporary France, the first volume of which, 
L’Ancien Régime, appeared in 1876.  
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)t was Taineǯs intention that the Origins would explain why France was so 
troubled by revolutionary instability. His work would analyse the nationǯs 
history using scientific objectivity in order to distil historical truth and instruct 
his fellow citizens in the art of proper government (Barrows 1981). Yet rather 
than turning to an analysis of the social and psychological impacts of 
industrialisation Taine sought to build a sustained assault on the social theories 
of the Enlightenment. Relying heavily on medical metaphors, Taine argued that 
these philosophies and theoretical arguments had instilled a poison into French 
society. As such, the Enlightenment had led to a fatal misunderstanding of mass 
psychology. In so doing, a highly evolved French society had laid itself open to 
the atavistic barbarity and irrationality of the crowd; revolution, or, as Taine saw 
it, dissolution, and the erratic history of the nation after 1789, was the inevitable 
result.  
 
Taine drew heavily on Hobbesian and Darwinian ideas. He saw hierarchical 
social order as a triumph of evolution, as the Leviathan through which 
civilisation escapes from the primal barbarism and inhumanity inherent in the 
primitive masses. )n this sense Taineǯs Origins portrayed the aristocracy, prior to 
1789, to be a highly evolved elite that had gained its position of authority by 
forcing hierarchy, and consequently order, on the lower orders of society. Through military force, civilisationǯs last word, the aristocracy had lifted society 
out of its atavistic origins. For Taine the elites deserved their position of power, 
because they were the institutions that imposed civilisation on a substratum of 
barbarity. The masses could not constrain their primitive barbarities and, if let 
free, could only create chaos. Consequently, the state was required to act as a 
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dyke to resist the torrent of these brute forces; ǲdespotic if need be against their 
despotismǳ (Taine, 1888: 242). For Taine the Enlightenment was toxic because it 
tried to implant reason in the brains of the lower orders, whose minds were 
incapable of dealing with such complexity. The ǲglowing expressions of Rousseau 
and his successors...blaze up like burning coals discharging clouds of smoke and 
intoxicating vapour" (Taine, 1888: 326). The poison had broken down the 
psychological and political structures that maintained civilised behaviour, "men 
began to live again like beasts" (Taine, 1876: 208; see Barrows 1981; McClelland, 
1989).  
 
From his position as a wealthy and outraged onlooker, Taine appears blind to the 
aggression of the state. He saw only inherent regression, barbarity and savagery 
in the actions of the crowd. For him and many others in his class, the crowd itself 
was the mechanism through which such pathology was released. But Origins was 
important because it provided the first Ǯscientificǯ account of the mechanisms of this release: Ǯvibration of the nervous mechanismǯ ȋTaine ͳͺ͹͸: ʹʹͳȌ, Ǯcontagion’ 
(Taine, 1876: 36-͵͹Ȍ, and Ǯfeverishness’ (Taine 1876: 52). The result was a 
deranged mind among the lower orders, prey to hallucination and Ǯdeliriumǯ who 
accustomed ǲto the open air, to the exercise of his limbs, his attention flags if he 
stands for a quarter of an hour; generalised expressions find their way into his 
mind only as sound.... He becomes drowsy unless a powerful vibrating voice 
contagiously arouses in him the instincts of flesh and blood, the personal cravings, 
the secret enmities which, restrained by outward discipline, are always ready to be 
set freeǳ (Taine, 1888: 240).  
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The politics of classic crowd psychology. 
For Taine the crowd was a mob, which began as a leaderless hoard arising from 
the primitive mass. The complex social history of the industrial revolution, the 
intergroup struggles between the national state and local people, the patterning 
of crowd action, the moral economy and the notions of legitimacy all 
disappeared. In its place was a pathological regression into primitive barbarism. 
The crowd was understood in terms of unconscious, instinctual behaviours, 
arising endogenously rather than as an outcome of particular social and historical processes. )n this way Taineǯs crowd psychology was ideological; the 
complex history, the role of the state, the complex ideas and philosophies, indeed 
the meaningful nature of crowd action itself could all be flagrantly dismissed. 
From Taine onwards the pathology of the mass and of its agent of change, the 
crowd, was not in question – it was a Ǯscientificǯ fact. 
 
During the period when Taine's work was appearing, the crowd, the mass, and 
revolution were becoming ever-increasing theoretical and political concerns 
among the establishment. It was hoped that the emerging social sciences would 
not simply provide a valid understanding of the problems of industrial society 
but also a technological solution. If Brunel could use technology to build bridges 
over vast chasms, railways across continents, and tunnels under great rivers, 
then the new positivist sciences should also be able to help conquer the central 
problem of social disorder in industrial society. A central figure in popularizing 
this project was Gustave Le Bon whose classic The Crowd (Le Bon, 1895; trans 
1926) stands as a testament to the late 19th century attempt to turn Ǯcrowd scienceǯ into a positivist inspired technology of social control.  
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Le Bon, like Taine, stands in a long line of French right-wing racist and anti-
Semitic intellectuals (McClelland 1970). By 1860 he was living in Paris training 
to become a doctor of medicine, but, on qualifying, established himself through a 
career in publishing. He plagiarised the findings of the closed societies of science 
and disseminated them to a public eager to understand their new positivist 
world. In this he was extremely successful. By 1870 he was living a wealthy life 
solely on the profits of his books. Le Bon remained in Paris during both the 
Franco-Prussian war and the Commune. The experience of this reinforced in him 
a rejection of the tenets of 1789. But more importantly it led him to understand 
the crowd as being central to France's malaise.  
 
Le Bon was an ardent supporter of social hierarchy and committed himself to an 
attack on all forms of egalitarianism, not only socialism but also democracy 
(Barrows 1981; Nye 1975). Like Taine, he believed that rigid and hierarchical 
social order was an evolutionary triumph. Like Taine, he also saw the Commune 
as an attempt by the masses to destroy society and throw it back down the 
ladder of evolution. In 1894 Le Bon published a synthesis of work that drew 
heavily on the perspectives of the masses set out in Taine's Origins. Les Lois 
Psychologiques de l'Evolution des Peuples (1894), established the ideological 
background into which his most influential work, La Psychologie des Foules 
(1895), would fit as a key piece in a jigsaw of 19th century social theory 
(McClelland 1989).  
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Le Bon argued that civilisation was a fragile structure, the keystone of which was 
the ruling elite who, with their superiority, held back the inherent despotism of 
the masses. Since Le Bon was writing at a point where the ruling elites were 
fearful and the masses were agitating, his work found immediate resonance. 
McClelland puts it concisely when he states ǲwhen Le Bon's The Crowd appeared, 
the psychology of the crowd was a recognised intellectual genre. [It] was scientific, 
even technical, in all the appropriate senses: it had its own special vocabulary; it 
might be able to provide a technique of crowd control and manipulation. [It] was a 
great publishing success because it was able to summarise what had been worrying 
the savants within the academic world of social science at a time when the literate 
public were themselves worrying about much the same things. The secret of Le 
Bon's success was to use science to frighten the public, and then to claim that what 
science could understand, it could also control. (McClelland 1989: 196). 
 
In the work of Le Bon, the base instincts of the crowd began to be conceptualised 
in a pragmatic manner. For Le Bon the crowd was inevitable in industrial society 
and times of social change society would collapse into a primordial quagmire of 
the mass. Consequently, the question was how the forces of the crowd could be 
harnessed in order for a new social order to emerge. Le Bon proposed his 
theoretical vision as the toolbox through which this could be achieved. This 
allowed him to portray the crowd as a source of energy, which, if properly 
harnessed, could be used to revitalise rather than threaten the nation. By 1910 
his ideological vision had culminated in La Psychologie Politique et la Defense 
Sociale where he was to deal more precisely with the crowdǯs utility in the 
defence of his vision of the Ǯnew orderǯ (Le Bon, 1910). In this way Le Bon hoped 
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that his crowd psychology could be used by Ǯgreat menǯ in defence of 
nationalism, turning the crowd against that which he saw as societyǯs enemy – 
revolutionary socialism. Little wonder then that both Hitler and Mussolini cite Le 
Bon as sources of political inspiration (Reicher, 1996a).  
  
Le Bon, like all of the classic theorists of mass psychology, turns to the internal 
functioning of the crowd in order to build his explanation. For him there were 
three central mechanisms of crowdǯs psychology: submergence, contagion, and 
suggestibility. The first refers to a loss of self through anonymity in the crowd. 
The second refers to the uncritical social influence process that allows any idea 
or sentiment to spread unheeded through the crowd. The third is the Ǯhypnoticǯ 
state that allows this contagion to occur. Through these mechanisms, Le Bon 
proposed that when an individual enters the crowd the Ǯlaw of mental unityǯ 
governs behaviour. That is, in the crowd, the individual self or personality disappears, to be replaced by the Ǯracial unconsciousǯ or Ǯgroup mindǯ – 
characterized by reduced intelligence, atavistic impulses and emotionality. This 
would explain why the civilised lone individual descends ǲseveral rungs of 
civilisationǳ and in the crowd ǲis a barbarianǳ (1895: trans 1926: 32). In this 
fashion Le Bon followed Taine by ignoring the complex history of crowd events 
and the contexts that gave crowd behaviours their meaning. Instead he produced 
a de-contextualised crowd based upon reductionist assumptions of its 
irrationality. In other words, he reified the outcome of particular historical 
circumstances by treating them as if they were fixed and universal 
characteristics of the crowd.   
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Tied up with this ideological vision of the crowd was also the legitimisation of 
reactionary policing. If the crowd is irrational, there was no point in reasoning 
with it; all that was required was the use of coercion and violence to protect 
civilisation from its inherent pathology (McClelland 1989). Thus, in Le Bonian 
terms, any violence of the mass was not understood in terms of a particular 
group evoking meaningful resistance to others. Instead violence was seen as a 
natural expression of fixed and pathological tendencies. By constructing the 
crowd in this way, he was able to present the forces of law and order as a means 
of protecting civilisation from that inherent pathology. Classical crowd 
psychology therefore undermined democratic and socialist agitation by 
presenting it as a pathological intrusion while simultaneously legitimising its 
coercive repression. So while La Psychologie des Foules (1895) stands as the 
culmination of classical Ǯcrowd scienceǯ, this was not in any sense because it was 
valid. Classical theory took root because these ideas served a useful political and 
ideological purpose for the powerful - a purpose that has ensured that the 
picture painted of the pathology of the crowd remains deeply entrenched in Ǯcommon senseǯ understanding of the science that find an echo in modern 
popular representation of crowd action in the 21st Century.  
 
From classical crowd science to a social identity approach to crowd psychology. 
From the perspective of modern social science, Le Bonǯs classical work on the 
crowd appears not only antiquated but also impressionistic and wanting in 
empirical evidence. However, from the middle of the 20th century classical crowd 
science was reinvigorated and reinforced through American social psychology in the form of Ǯde-individuationǯ theory where the anonymity of the crowd is 
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understood to preclude the normal functioning of the self (Festinger, Pepitone & 
Newcombe, 1959; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers 1989; Zimbardo 1970). However it is 
experimental social psychology itself, which has ultimately served to expose de-
individuation theory as flawed by showing that that there are no generic 
behavioral effects of anonymity (Postmes & Spears 1998). Moreover, across the 
social sciences different researchers in multiple disciplines began highlighting 
the inadequacy and limitations of classical theory and the need to analyse the 
perspective of crowd members in their historical context (Barrows, 1981; Nye, 
1975; Rudé, 1959, 1964; Reicher, 1982; Turner et al, 1987). Rather than simply 
looking from the outside in, and trying to abstract crowd behaviour from its 
context, it was increasingly recognised that crowd behaviour could only be 
properly understood by examining the perceptions and meanings held by crowd 
participants.  
 
Since the 1960s, there has been a blossoming in what has been called history 
from below. Since history is first written by those who are (a) literate and (b) 
powerful, a historiography of popular culture, which is often closer to the reality 
experienced by the masses, has been late to develop. The moral economy of the 
18th century food riot (Thompson, 1971) is a case in point. From the point of 
view of Le Bon, the food riot, presumably prompted by hunger, should have 
taken the form of a smash and grab raid on grain stores, with participants 
primarily satisfying their hunger and stopping when physically satiated. Of 
course, the rioters themselves wrote almost nothing down about their subjective 
experiences. However an inspection of what the rioters actually did reveals 
distinct patterns to their behaviour – patterns that reflect historically and 
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culturally determined definitions of legitimacy. Thus, the riotersǯ principal 
concern was not hunger but injustice; they threatened violence against only 
those who sought to substitute the paternalistic principles of need with market 
principles of profit. They acted collectively only in so far as they needed to in order to restore those older values. For example, while they seized the millersǯ 
sacks of grains, instead of eating the contents they sold them in local markets at a 
price the rioters judged to be fair, even returning the empty sacks neatly folded.  
 
The evidence of this historiography further highlights the inadequacy of classic 
theories of the crowd; crowd behaviour in 19th Century France was not random 
and meaningless but limited and normatively patterned (Tilly et al, 1975). 
Additionally, it begins to provide the basic elements of a more adequate 
psychology of the crowd: the idea that these limits were a function of definitions 
of legitimate conduct which in turn were shaped by historically and socially 
determined world-views or ideologies. Thus Thompson (1971) refers to Ǯlegitimizing notionsǯ shared by rioters. Moreover, if crowd behaviour was 
controlled, meaningful, and conscious, then this meant that an adequate crowd 
psychology required a theory of the self or identity. The fundamental flaw of Le 
Bon and those who followed him was that crowd behaviour was interpreted as 
the absence of the self when it was apparent that crowd behaviour was only 
explicable in terms of the salience of a socially determined collective sense of self 
or social identity.  
 
Tajfel (1978: ͸͵Ȍ defined social identity as ǲthat part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or 
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groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membershipǳ. However, one of the key aspects of this approach is that identity is 
understood to be fundamentally linked to material social structures created by 
social categories which exist in relationships defined in terms of power, status 
and legitimacy (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The theory proposes that in order to 
relate to the world behaviourally we must have the psychological capacity to 
identify with those categories such that we can accurately define ourselves to 
reproduce or challenge those social structures accordingly. Correspondingly, the 
theory was developed to propose a dynamic self, which varies in abstraction and 
ranges from our personal to a range of social identities. Thus, rather than a single 
self which is either present or absent in the crowd we each have multiple selves, 
each of which can become salient, or self relevant, in different social contexts 
(Turner, Oakes, Hogg, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & 
McGarty 1994).  
 
While these identities come to define individuals, they are at the same time a 
fundamentally social product. To define oneself as a male may be something 
deeply personal but at the same time the defining dimensions of gender are 
socially and historically constructed and therefore exist above and well beyond anyoneǯs individuality. Once salient or self-relevant within specific social 
contexts, a social identity comes to define oneǯs position in a set of material 
social relationships, allowing us to respond meaningfully and collectively to our 
situation. Our identities proscribe behaviour, defining the appropriate nature of 
our response given that position. In so doing, social identities both define 
relationships between people but also act as the basis for transforming social 
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relations through acting as the psychological basis for collective action (Turner, 
et al 1987; 1994).  
 
The concept of social identity has been particularly useful to the analysis of 
crowd behaviour where the central analytic question is how is it that people are 
able to act spontaneously and coherently without formal leadership or decision-
making structures? The social identity approach suggests that, when acting on 
the basis of a social identity, psychologically we become interchangeable 
exemplars of the relevant social category. We therefore can infer appropriate 
conduct and are able to influence and coordinate behaviour to the extent that 
such action is consistent with the identity in question (Turner et al, 1987). These 
processes were first illustrated through Reicherǯs ȋͳͻͺͶ; ͳͻͺ͹Ȍ study of the St 
Pauls riot, one of the many inner city disturbances in the UK during the early 
1980s. While even those politically sympathetic to the actions of these urban rioters characterised their violence as a Ǯprimitive outburstǯ, Reicher argued that 
their behaviour was in fact sophisticated and even creative. While it was violent, 
that violence was found to reflect and to be limited by the definition of social 
identity shared by the rioters.  
 
This social identity of the St Pauls rioters had three key features: the 
geographical locality of the St Pauls neighbourhood, a history of antagonism with 
the police, and a desire for freedom, which was seen to be in conflict with the 
high unemployment, poverty and exploitation by businesses run by Ǯoutsidersǯ. 
The pattern of the rioting reflected these defining parameters. In the first phase, once the police had been driven from the district of St Paulǯs, the rioters 
 22 
remained within St Paulǯs itself despite its close proximity to shops in the city 
centre that could have been looted. The key targets for the violence were the 
police themselves, and there were no collective attacks on passers by or other 
groups. The subsequent attacks on property in the second phase of the riot were 
not sporadic acts of wanton destruction but had a certain pattern: the benefits 
office, post office, and banks were damaged, as were outsider-owned businesses, 
while locally owned shops and local houses were actively protected; the former not simply symbolic but instrumental in their role as agents of the riotersǯ 
oppression.  
 
The social identity approach not only provides a theory of collective action as a 
symbolic representation of participantsǯ understanding of self and surrounding 
social relations, it has also begun to enrich our understanding of the very nature 
of the self. Indeed, as Reicher (1996b), has argued, the crowd is actually a 
privileged arena for studying social and psychological processes. One reason is 
that during crowd events social relations that might have appeared as fixed and 
given can and do change. In other words, as we have seen from our analysis of 
French social history, while not all crowds are associated with social change, 
social change very often appears to involve crowds (Alford & Friedland, 1985). 
 
This means understanding the self, or identity, not just as a reflection of social 
reality but also as the psychological basis for its formation. Grasping this duality 
of identity – socially created as well as creative – has meant advancing our meta-
theoretical understanding of the relationship between identity and context. In 
this approach to crowds, identity and context are understood not as different 
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orders of reality but as two moments in an historical and interactive process. 
Studies of students rioting during a protest against the removal of grants 
(Reicher 1996c), demonstrators rioting during a protest against the 
implementation of a tax (e.g. Stott & Drury 2000), a series of protests around the 
extension of the M11 motorway in London (Drury & Reicher 2000), and rioting 
among football fans (Stott & Reicher 1998; Stott et al, 2001, 2007) each revealed 
a similar pattern of interaction. This pattern demonstrated the necessity of a 
specific theoretical approach to the conceptualisation of identity and context. 
 
The first condition common to each was a contrast of representations between 
the social groups involved – particularly over definitions of appropriate conduct. 
The second condition was that the police – the out-group to the crowd during 
these events – had the power to put their definitions into practice. More 
specifically, police use of coercive force (e.g. baton charges) against a crowd who 
saw themselves as posing little, if any, threat to Ǯpublic orderǯ corresponded with 
increases in the number of people in the crowd viewing the police as an 
illegitimate force. Such experiences of illegitimacy corresponded with a change in the crowdsǯ social identities along two critically important dimensions. On the 
one hand, increasing numbers of people within the crowd came to see conflict 
against the police as acceptable. On the other, a redefined sense of unity against 
the police emerged that subsequently empowered those seeking confrontation 
(Stott & Drury 2000). In other words, the development of widespread rioting 
was not simply an inevitable product of the inherent pathology of mass 
psychology; nor was it simply the acting out of a prior, given social identity. 
Rather these norms emerged as a meaningful response to the particular patterns 
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and material realities of group interactions that occurred during the events 
themselves.  
 
In this account, the crowd is the subject of history, sometimes, despite the 
intentions of its participants. The most moderate conscious intentions 
sometimes become transformed into radicalism because these intentions are 
enacted in a context in which others define them differently. Those others, if they 
have power, act to reshape the context for participants, which in turn transform 
the psychological basis for collective actions in the crowd.  Put more simply, 
acting upon context, changes that context and changes the self that derives its 
meaning from that context. 
 
Conclusions 
Through looking back at nineteenth century France we can begin to revisit and 
question the popular conceptualisation of the crowds witnessed during the 2011 English riots. By contextualising the emergence of crowd Ǯscienceǯ we can see the 
ideological foundations of these assumptions of the crowd as an amorphous, 
monolithic and pathological entity. We suggest that the social identity approach 
provides the basis for a properly scientific understanding of crowd action during 
those riots (Reicher & Stott, 2011). The social identity approach rejects the 
pathological and decontextualized analysis that was so rapidly popularised. 
Instead it points toward the pressing need to interpret those crowd actions as a 
meaningful and symbolic reaction to the subjective and material realities of the 
participantsǯ social context. As such, it forces us to consider the centrality and 
determining role of structural relations and policing in the aetiology of the riots 
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(Guardian/LSE, 2011; Newburn et al, 2015). In rejecting the classic model of the 
crowd, the social identity project has in turn begun to transform social 
psychological understanding of the self, recognising that crowd action is not just 
a meaningful reflection of the social world but also a meaningful project of its 
creation.  
 
Taken together our arguments raises important and powerful questions. Given 
that classical crowd theory lacks explanatory power why is it that it remains so 
salient in contemporary popular representation of riot? Moreover, in the context 
of riots like those experienced in 2011, is it that theory capable of explaining 
such phenomena so easily swept aside in favour of assertion of the classical 
account?     
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